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THE STABILITY OF FLOOD DEFENSES ON PERMEABLE SOILS: THE LONDON
AVENUE CANAL FAILURES IN NEW ORLEANS.
W. Kanning
Delft University of Technology
Delft, the Netherlands

S. Van Baars & J.K.Vrijling
Delft University of Technology
Delft, the Netherlands

ABSTRACT
The two failures of the London Avenue Canal floodwalls contributed largely to the flooding of central New Orleans due to hurricane
Katrina. In this paper, both failures are analyzed and compared to each other since the flood defenses are both located on permeable
soils. Photo’s observation and calculations are used for the analysis. Both failures are caused by the permeable sand layer below the
floodwall that allowed high pore water pressures to develop below the floodwall. However, the south breach seems to be caused by
the piping failure mechanism and the north breach by loss of stability. At the South breach, the impermeable top layer was thicker than
at the North breach, increasing the stability. The North beach was less vulnerable for piping and the lack of stability caused a large
breach. The London Avenue Canal failures are a clear yet tragic example of the failure of flood defenses on permeable soils. The
failures show that multiple failure mechanism may occur and since there are many flood defenses on permeable soils world wide, the
lessons from Katrina can be used to prevent future catastrophes.

INTRODUCTION
In this paper it is investigated how the two floodwalls along
the London Avenue Canal failed during the hurricane Katrina
disaster in 2005. Photographic evidence, local observations
and methods from the Netherlands are used to derive the
possible causes of failure. The word levee (or floodwall) is
used when discussing the New Orleans situation, while dyke is
used when discussing the Dutch earthen flood defenses.

Lake Pontchartrain start to blow from the north, resulting in
high water levels due to wind set-up on the north side of New
Orleans (Kanning et al, 2007)
Lake Pontchartrain

London Avenue Canal

III.
I

Katrina in New Orleans
The flood disaster in New Orleans in August and September
2005 due to Hurricane Katrina showed once again the
vulnerability of low lying areas to floods. Hurricane Katrina
closely passed New Orleans, causing the flood defense system
to breach on many locations. The severe effects shocked the
world, with over 700 direct casualties, more than 100 billion
US$ damage and an enormous social disruption. Hurricane
Katrina approached New Orleans from the south on August
28th, 2005, passing the city on the eastern side. The hurricane
gained full force above the Gulf of Mexico. It caused the
water levels on the coast to rise due to wind set up. The
counter clockwise rotation of the hurricane magnified the
wind set up near New Orleans. Besides, the high wind speeds
of more than 250 km/hour resulted in a severe wave attack on
the coast. The high water levels in Lake Borgne progressed
into the city through shipping canals that connect the
Mississippi River with the Gulf of Mexico and Lake
Pontchartrain. As the hurricane passes the city, the winds on
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Lake Borgne

II.

Fig. 1. Levee breaches in New Orleans after Katrina
A range of failure mechanisms was observed during hurricane
Katrina. In general, three groups of failure mechanisms may
be distinguished (see Fig. 1):
I. Erosion of the flood defenses along Lake Borgne. These
flood defenses mainly consisted of earthen embankments
and were destroyed for many kilometers because the flood
defenses were not high and strong enough to withstand
the water levels and waves.
II. Failure of flood walls and scour around transitions. The
high water levels in Lake Borgne progressed into the
1

shipping canals that connect the Mississippi with Lake
Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico. The floodwalls
were not high enough or the transitions between soils and
solid structures were not strong enough and erosion due to
overtopping caused several failures.
III. Geotechnical failure of floodwalls along two of the three
dewatering canals. The wind induced high water levels
along the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain progressed
into the dewatering canals that enter the city. Although
the water levels did not reach the design level, the
floodwalls along these canals failed at three locations
(two at London Avenue Canal and one at 17th Street
Canal).
This study focuses on the two London Avenue Canal failures.

Dykes
- Overflow
- Wave overtopping
- Sliding inner slope
- Horizontal sliding
- Sliding outer slope
- Micro-instability
- Piping
- Erosion outer slope
- Erosion foreshore
- Settlement
- Drifting ice
- Ship Collision

Dunes
- Erosion
- Erosion foreshore
- Sliding inner slope
Hydraulic structures
- Strength/stability of structure
- Strength/stability of foundation
- Strength/stability of transition
- Non closure of structure

The piping failure mechanism (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) receives a lot
of attention in the Netherlands nowadays because it was
assessed to be the most dominant failure mechanism in a
recent risk assessment.

Netherlands and Flood Defenses
The Netherlands are famous for the long history with flood
defense systems. The flood defense principles in the
Netherlands are used in this paper to analyze the London
Avenue Canal failures. In response to numerous disasters, the
construction of the current extensive flood defense system
started less than a century ago. Firstly, following serious dyke
breaching and flooding around the Southern Sea in 1912, it
was decided that this inner sea be closed off, which was done
by constructing the IJsselmeer Dam in 1933. Similarly, after
the catastrophic flood disaster of 1953 in Zeeland it was
decided to close off the islands in the southwest of the country
from the sea. This was done by building 11 large dams and
storm surge barriers, the construction of which was completed
in 1997. Although the Dutch flood defense system has
improved over the years, there were still serious dyke
problems with high water in the rivers in 1988, 1993 and 1995,
leading, in 1993, to 250,000 people being evacuated. And in
2006, only 44% of the 2875 km Dutch dykes, dams and dunes
met the dyke regulations set by the Ministry of Public Works,
Transportation and Water Management. The IJsselmeer dam,
among other defenses, does not meet the specified regulations.
These regulations are based on the different type of failure
mechanisms. According the regulations each dyke, dune or
hydraulic structure has to be checked for each of the failure
mechanisms.

Fig. 2. Piping behind a dyke, next to the ditch

Fig. 3. Emergency measures for the piping mechanism (ENW,
2006)

Piping
Failure Mechanisms
In the Netherlands, the design and safety assessment of dykes
is based on a list of failure mechanisms. In general, the
following failure mechanisms of dykes can be distinguished
(TAW, 1998):
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A dyke fails due to piping in case the soil particles below the
dyke are washed out due to excessive seepage. An example is
shown in Fig. 4 for an earthen dyke with a clay blanket on top
of a sand layer. Failures due to piping not only occurred in the
Netherlands in the past, but also in Germany (Kolb, 1964).
Four stages are defined: In the first stage, water pressures
develop below the inside clay blanket. In the second stage, the
clay blanket is cracked due to excessive pore pressures and
sand boils start to develop. In the third phase, a canal develops
below the dyke. In the fourth stage, this canal progressively
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increases until an open connection between the outside water
and the inside is formed. The open connection can finally
cause the dyke to collapse due to subsidence and cracking of
the dyke’s body.

water and a large section of floodwall sled inland, see Fig. 6.
Uplift however, was not the main reason for this failure.
Horizontal stability under uplift conditions is a problem in the
Netherlands as well. A river dyke failed due to this mechanism
in the past (near Streefkerk), one real scale experiment was
carried out to study the mechanism (near Bergambacht) and
even a special addition to slope stability software was
developed.

Fig. 4. Piping in case of an earthen dyke (TAW, 2002)
Studies of the development of a pipe below a glass plate show
that the pipe is not a single pipe, but a series of meandering
pipes, creating new branches and closing some old ones, but
progressively growing in length until it has reached the other
side in case of high loading, see Fig. 5.

Fig. 6. 17th Street Canal failure in New Orleans due to
hurricane Katrina (ILIT, 2006)

THE LONDON AVENUE CANAL

Location

Fig. 5. Development of pipes in an experimental setting
The reliability of a dyke with respect to piping can be assessed
with the methods of Bligh and Lane or with the more
advanced method of Sellmeijer (Sellmeijer, 1988; TAW,
2002). Sellmeijer takes into account the most influences and is
used for the assessment of dykes in the Netherlands.
According to Sellmeijer, a critical water level hp is defined:

γ

hp = α cL  p − 1 (0.68 − 0.1ln c) tan θ > 0
γw 

(1)

The London Avenue Canal is located in the center of New
Orleans. The canal was constructed for the dewatering of the
central New Orleans area. Due to compaction of the subsoil
following the dewatering of the former marsh, the area is
situated below Mean Sea Level (MSL). Hence, all rain that
falls has to be pumped out. A drainage system was constructed
that drains all excess water by means of a pump station that is
located at the south end of the canal. The north end of the
canal has a curved shape to prevent waves from entering. The
canal used to be in open connection with Lake Pontchartrain,
but a closure structure with pumps is constructed which will
be closed in case of high water, reducing the length of the
overall flood defense system.

Where α includes limited thickness of sand layer, c
incorporates the erosion resistance of the sand layer, L is the
leakage length, γp is the density of the grain particle, γw is the
density of the water and θ is the rolling friction angle. Piping
occurs in a corrected load H is higher than hp. H is the water
level minus 0.3 × D (D is the layer thickness). For more
information is referred to (TAW, 2002)

Stability
Floodwall instability proved to be a problem during hurricane
Katrina in the nearby 17th Street Canal (IPET, 2006). The
weak soils were not able to resist the pressure induced by the
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The London Avenue Canal Floodwalls

North
breach

South
breach

Fig. 7. The London Avenue Canal (based on earth.google.com)

Geology
New Orleans is located in the Mississippi Delta. The
Mississippi river formed the area in the course of many
centuries and created typical delta geology that consist of
natural levee deposits, organic soils, clay layers and sand
layers. The Pleistocene layers are found at a depth of 15 to 30
meters. The upper Holocene layers are characterized by highly
compressible, low strength materials and beach sand deposits.
The London Avenue Canal is located in an area that used to be
a swamp and that was drained to create residential area.
Organic, weak soils are found near the soil surface, see Fig. 8.
Below the organic soils, clay and sand layers are found.
Especially the highly permeable sand layers are important.
These are beach sands or barrier island deposits.

The floodwalls of the London Avenue canal are all from the Iwall type: A concrete wall on top of a steel sheet pile. The
walls are constructed differently from the design. The walls
are designed with an elevation of NGVD + 4.2 m and a tip
elevation of the sheet pile ranging from NGVD -6.1 m to -13.4
m. At the location of the breaches, the design sheet pile tip
elevations are NGVD – 6.1 m while opposite of the North
breach, the elevation is NGVD -10.7 m (Burk & Associates,
1986). The design water level is 0.6 m below the top of the
floodwall. The walls are constructed however with an
elevation of NGVD + 4.4 m and a tip elevation of the sheet
pile ranging from NGVD -3.6 m to -8.7 m. A study shows
considerable changes in time of the different vertical datum. In
this study, the NAVD88 (2004.65) reference is used, denoted
with NAVD. This is approximately 0.46 m lower than the
NGVD datum and 0.06 m above local mean sea level (IPET,
2006A, pp II-93, 94)
At the location of the breaches, the as-built sheet pile tip
elevations are NGVD – 4.9 m while opposite of the North
breach, the elevation is NGVD - 8.7 m (USACE, 1994). The
floodwalls have a height of NAVD + 3.9 m. (IPET, 2006A p
II-94). The canal floor is approximately 5.5 to 5.8 m below sea
level (Team Louisiana, 2006 p 99). The canal depths are
maintained with dredging.

Water Levels
The most important parameter for failure is the water level.
There are hardly observations of the water levels during
hurricane Katrina. Most water levels in literature are based on
model results. These models have been calibrated with the
available observations. The nearest observation-based
hydrograph is near the entrance of the 17th Street Canal
(approximately 4.7 km away from the London Avenue Canal
entrance), see Fig. 9, where a maximum water level of NAVD
+3.3 m is recorded. Interpolation by IPET based on high water
marks results in a water level in the London Avenue Canal of
approximately NAVD +3.5 m (IPET, 2006A, p. IV-31). Fig. 9
shows the peak between 6 and 11 ft only lasts for about 6
hours. The floodwalls not necessarily failed at the maximum
water level. According to IPET, the water level at the South
breach was approximately between NAVD +2.2 m and +2.5 m
(IPET, 2006A, p. V-39) and the water level at the North
breach was approximately between NAVD +2.5 m and +2.9 m
(IPET, 2006A p. V-40). Since time dependent processes may
be involved, the complete hydrograph has to be taken into
account.

Fig. 8. Geology of the London Avenue Canal (Nelson, 2006)
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Fig. 9. Observed water levels at the 17 Street Canal (IPET,
2006A pp IV-30)
Other indications give additional information about the water
levels:
• No scour behind the floodwalls is observed (unlike
floodwall along the Inner Harbor Navigation
Channel), indicating the water levels remained below
the top of the floodwall
• The Robert E. Lee Boulevard Bridge, next to the
north breach, is lower than the adjacent floodwalls,
creating a gap in the system of flood defenses.
• The two breaches are both on the same canal. This
indicated the South breach probably failed first: In
case the north breach would have failed first, the
water level at the South breach would have dropped
since its ‘supply’ would have to pass the north breach.
Vice versa is not necessarily true since water levels at
the north breach experience less influence of the
south breach because a gradient of the water level
will develop in a relatively small canal. The thick
layer of sand at the South breach indicates the water
flowed in for a significant amount of time.

Fig. 10. Initial repairs on the South breach (source: IPET,
2006A)

Fig. 11. The South breach after initial repairs (source: W.
Kanning)

THE SOUTH BREACH OF THE LONDON AVENUE
CANAL
The south breach is located on the east side of the London
Avenue Canal near Mirabeau Avenue. The floodwall
supposedly failed between 07.00 and 08.00 am on August 29th,
2007. The water level was approximately NAVD + 2.5 m
which is well below the top of the floodwall (NAVD +3.9 m)
and below the design level (NAVD +3.3 m).

Fig. 12. Sand layer in vicinity of the London Avenue Canal
south breach (source: W. Kanning)

Forensic Evidence
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show that (in contradiction to the North
breach) the I-walls did not fall over, but sank down. The
breach is relatively small and consists only of a few elements.
The pictures indicate that first a large amount of sand washed
from below the floodwall through piping underneath the I-wall
which made it possible for the I-walls to sink down in the
liquefied sand layer.
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Fig. 13. Sand layer covering the patio of a house in the
vicinity of the London Avenue canal south breach (source: J.K.
Vrijling)
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Cross Section
The cross section of Fig. 14 is based on literature (IPET,
2006B) and personal surveying. This cross section serves as
the basis for the computations in the next sections. The ILIT
study divides the swamp/marsh layer into two layers which
together have the same thickness as depicted below. The
beach sand layer is also divided into two layers in this study
(ILIT, 2006, pp. 8-119). The height of the floodwall is NAVD
+3.9 m; the depth of the sheet pile is NAVD -5.3 m below sea
level (IPET, 2006B pV-9-30). The thickness of the inland
blanket that consists of marsh deposits is approximately 3.6 m.

effective vertical stresses are 0, which means no shear stresses
can develop. Hence, all kind of possible failure planes may
develop.

Piping
Different methods to asses the vulnerability for piping are
used in this study. The impermeable layer on top of the sand
layer should have been cracked (due to uplift). In the previous
section was shown that critical water levels for uplift were
lower than the occurring water levels. Since not all parameters
are known, the results should be regarded as rough estimates.
The methods of Bligh, Lane and Sellmeijer all indicate the
structure is sensitive to piping, see Table 1. In this table, ∆hmax
is the maximum occurred water level and hcritical is the critical
water level for piping. The leakage length is estimated to 23 m;
the coefficient of Bligh is 15 m and the coefficient of Lane 7
m. For Sellmeijer, the rolling friction angle is 43 degrees, d50
is 0.23 mm and the permeability is 4*10-4 m/s. For other
coefficients is referred to TAW (1999). As can be seen in Fig.
9, the water levels are a few hours above critical water levels.
Table 1: Piping sensitivity London Avenue Canal South
breach

Fig. 14. Cross section London Avenue Canal South breach
based on (IPET, 2006B) and own measurements. Measures in
meters; reference according to NAVD88

Assessment method
∆hmax (m) hcritical (m)
Bligh
4.6
1.5 (2.4)*
Lane
4.6
1.6
Sellmeijer
4.6
3.2 (4.3)*
*Corrected for vertical leakage length

Sensitive
Yes
Yes
Yes

Conclusion South Breach
Stability analysis
In case of a levee and a blanket on top of permeable layer, an
uplift situation occurs. To determine the effect of hydraulic
pressures, the uplift criterion is analyzed. The vertical stress
due to the blanket is:

σ v = hblanket ⋅ γ blanket = 3.6 m ⋅15.7 kN/m3 = 56.5 kN/m 2
(2)
Where σv is vertical stress, γblanker is the density of the blanket
material and hblanket is the thickness of the blanket. The
corresponding critical water level ∆h (assuming no entrance
resistance) is:

∆h = σ v / γ water =

56.5 kN/m 2
= 5.7 m
10 kN/m3

(3)

This corresponds to a water level at NAVD -4.7 + 5.7 =
NAVD + 1.0 m. This is far below the occurring water level of
approximately NAVD +2.5 m at failure (see section 2.4). The
peak water level only last for several hours but the very
permeable sand layer enables a rapid increase in pore water
pressure. Since there is uplift of the inland blanket, the
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The photos, local observations and calculations indicate the
floodwall failed due to the piping mechanism. The
calculations indicate that both stability and piping were critical
for the London Avenue Canal south breach. The excess pore
water pressure in the sand layer was relieved due to cracks in
the blanket. These cracks caused the first sand boils. Why the
piping mechanism occurred exactly here, and not at any
adjacent location is probably because of spatial variation and
local discontinuities (e.g. swimming pools, trees).

THE NORTH BREACH OF THE LONDON AVENUE
CANAL
The North breach of the London Avenue Canal is located on
the west side of the Canal near the Robert E. Lee boulevard
bridge. An analysis of the Army Corps of Engineers shows
that the floodwall failed at a water level of NAVD + 2.7 m
(IPET, 2006A p IV-173) which is well below the top of the
floodwall and even below design level.

6

Forensic Evidence
Fig. 15 shows the North breach of the London Avenue canal.
A large part of the I-wall has been pushed inland leaving a
large breach. The breach consists of 2 parts: a part of tumbled
segments and a gap without segments. This indicated the
floodwall first deformed over the full length, before the gap
developed (since the pressure was relieved from the tumbled
part). Fig. 16, Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 show the elevation of the
ground behind the embankment, including the elevation of a
playhouse. This heave is a clear sign of an uplift failure
mechanism. Besides, sand boils have been found here (IPET,
2006A).

Fig. 18. The playhouse after the breach (source: IPET, 2006A
p V-41)
Fig. 19 shows holes behind the floodwall opposite of the
breach which are likely caused by piping, the particles have
been washed out and a hole remains. The floodwall did not
fail here because the sheet pile was longer than on the opposite
site. Fig. 20 shows the only part of the floodwall where the
concrete notably breached: at the connection between the
tumbled wall and the surviving wall. Fig. 20 indicates that the
soil failed and not the structure (i.e. concrete wall and sheet
pile). Only at the connection between the tumbled floodwall
and the surviving floodwall, cracks in the concrete I wall are
observed.

Fig. 15. The London Avenue Canal North breach (IPET,
2006A)

Fig. 16. Elevated playhouse due to uplift (ILIT, 2006 pp 8-131)

Fig. 19. Piping holes at the protected side of the floodwall
opposite the breach of the London Avenue Canal North breach
(source: IPET, 2006A)

Fig. 17. The playhouse before the breach (source: IPET,
2006A pV-41)

Fig. 20. Cracked concrete floodwall at the London Avenue
Canal north breach (source: J.K. Vrijling)
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Cross Section

∆h = σ v / γ water =

The cross section of Fig. 21 is based on literature (IPET, 2006)
and own measurements. The height of the floodwall is NAVD
+3.9 m; the depth of the sheet pile is NAVD -5.4 m (IPET,
2006B p V-9-2). The thickness of the inland blanket that
consists of marsh deposits is approximately 2.8 m.

85.0 kN/m 2
= 8.5 m
10 kN/m 3

(7)

The corresponding critical water level is NAVD -4.4 + 8.5
=NAVD + 4.1 m which is above the water levels that occurred.

Piping
The methods of Bligh, Lane indicate the structure is sensitive
to piping, see Table 2. The method of Sellmeijer shows less
sensitivity for piping, mainly because of the low permeability
of the sand. The leakage length is estimated to 24 m; the
coefficient of Bligh is 15 m and the coefficient of Lane 7 m.
For Sellmeijer, the rolling friction angle is 43 degrees, d50 is
0.23 mm and the permeability is 6*10-5 m/s. For other
coefficients is referred to TAW (1999). Since not all
parameters are known, the outcomes should be treated
carefully.
Table 2: Piping sensitivity London Avenue Canal North
breach
Fig. 21. Cross section London Avenue Canal North Breach

Stability Analysis
Similar the South breach, the uplift criterion is analyzed. The
vertical stress due to the blanket is:

σ v = hblanket ⋅ γ blanket = 2.75 m ⋅16.5 kN/m 3 = 45.3 kN/m 2
(4)
The corresponding critical water level difference (assuming no
entrance resistance) is:

∆h = σ v / γ water

45.3 kN/m 2
=
= 4.5 m
10 kN/m3

(5)

This correspond to a water level at NAVD -4.4 + 4.5 = NAVD
+ 0.1 m. This is far below the occurring water level of
approximately NAVD + 2.5 to + 2.8 at failure (see section 2.4).
Even below the floodwall the effective stresses and so the
strength reduce to zero at rather low water levels. This low
critical water level also explains why residents complained
about wet gardens along the London Avenue Canal. The peak
water level only last for several hours but the very permeable
sand result in a rapid increase in water levels. Since there is
uplift of the inland blanket, the effective vertical stresses are 0,
which means no shear stresses can develop. Hence, all kind of
possible failure planes may develop.
The embankment on top of the swamp marsh layer results in a
vertical stress on top of the sand below the embankment of:

σ v = ( 2.75 m + 2.4 m ) ⋅16.5 kN/m3 = 85.0 kN/m 2
(6)

Paper No. 2.72

Assessment method
∆Hmax (m) Hcritical (m)
Bligh
5.2
1.5 (2.4)*
Lane
5.2
1.6
Sellmeijer
5.2
5.6 (6.7)*
*Corrected for vertical leakage length

Sensitive
Yes
Yes
Yes

Conclusion North Breach
Forensic evidence and observations indicates the floodwalls
failed due to stability problems caused by a combination of the
large water pressure on the wall and the large excess pore
pressure in the subsoil. This is confirmed by the stability
calculations. The different piping assessment methods are not
consistent whether the structure was sensitive for piping or not.
The floodwall may failed at this location because of the
presence of a extra weak peat layer.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
The two failure mechanisms of the floodwalls look different,
but are both based on the same fundamental principle: The
pore pressure in the sand layer reached the total vertical
stresses, reducing the effective stresses and the strength to
zero, causing the floodwall to sink down due to piping (South
breach) or fall sideways (North breach). Due to the zero
effective stresses, all kind of deformations and failure
mechanisms are possible.
The similarity of both failures is the high excess pore pressure
in the sand layer, leading to uplift forces on inland blanket and
floodwall instabilities. The difference is the effect it had on the
final way of failing. The North floodwall tumbled over, but
the South floodwall did not tumble over, because the thicker
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clay layer in South seems to have prevented the I-wall to
tumble by giving more passive resistance. The floodwall only
sank down because piping had washed away the sand below
This outcome of the calculations have changed the question:
“why did the uplift and instability in the North breach and the
uplift and piping in South breach happen?” to “why aren’t
there more failures?”. Is this because these two failures
reduced the load on the rest of the floodwall? Probably it was,
since the inundation of the area behind reduced the water
levels in the canals and thus the load on the floodwalls.
Furthermore, the effective stresses increased and therefore
increased the strength of the subsoil.

ILIT – Independent Levee Investigation Team [2006].
Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood
Protection Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005.
Published at http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/
IPET – Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce
[2006A]. Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and
Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System. Published
at https://ipet.wes.army.mil
IPET – Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce
(2006B). Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and
Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System VolV –
Appendix 1-10. Published at https://ipet.wes.army.mil

CONCLUSIONS

There are several failure mechanisms that can cause a
floodwall on permeable soils to fail. The London Avenue
Canal breaches are a clear case study to investigate how the
different mechanisms can contribute. Both breaches occurred
due to high excess pores pressures in the sand below the flood
defenses. It was concluded that the North breach occurred due
to a lack of stability and the South breach occurred due to
piping. This result is of importance for all other flood defenses
on permeable soils, although is should never be forgotten that
other failure mechanisms can contribute as well. The failures
show that multiple failure mechanism may occur and since
there are many flood defenses on permeable soils, the lessons
from Katrina may be used to prevent future catastrophes world
wide.
In the Netherlands it is commonly thought that piping is
mainly a problem during long lasting loads, hence during
flood waves on rivers that last for days or weeks. The idea is
that it takes quite some time for pore water pressures to build
up and for the sand particles to be removed. The main
attention for piping is therefore on river dykes. However, the
London Avenue Canal South breach revealed that piping can
occur very rapidly for specific conditions (uncovered
permeably layers with small entrance resistance) as well.
Besides, the London Avenue Canal North breach once again
emphasized the importance of the stability under uplift
mechanism.
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J.K. [2007). Lessons from New Orleans for the design and
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TAW - Technical Advisory Committee on Water defenses.
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